OOmnistu

Blog / Engineering Playbooks

Engineering Playbooks

Mobile app security checklist for founders

Use OWASP MASVS control areas to ask concrete questions about mobile storage, authentication, networking, code and privacy.

OOmnistu
Reviewed 2026-11-16 · 4 min read

The OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) groups mobile security controls into eight areas. We read each area's page on 15 November 2026. Below, OWASP's own control statements are quoted in short form, followed by a question you can ask your team. The questions are our framing, not OWASP's. For the group pages' individual test procedures (the MASTG), we read nothing.

The controls, by area

STORAGE. OWASP says apps handle PII, cryptographic material, secrets and API keys that may be stored locally, in private or in public locations, and may be leaked by accident through misused APIs or system features.

CRYPTO. OWASP's reasoning: phones are portable and easily lost, so someone with physical access could reach passwords, financial information and PII. It points to external standards such as NIST SP 800-175B and 800-57 and says poor key management can compromise even strong cryptography.

AUTH. OWASP says enforcement must be on the remote endpoint, but the app must follow best practices for the protocols it uses. Some apps rely only on local authentication, which must then be implemented securely. It also says the remote endpoint should be validated against standards such as OWASP ASVS.

NETWORK. OWASP says developers typically rely on TLS, but can accidentally disable platform secure defaults or bypass them with low-level APIs or third-party libraries. The area also covers trusting only specific certificate authorities (pinning).

PLATFORM. OWASP covers inter-process communication, WebViews and the user interface. It notes sensitive data such as passwords, card details and one-time passwords can leak through auto-generated screenshots, shoulder surfing or device sharing.

CODE. OWASP says apps receive data from the UI, IPC, network and file system, which should be treated as untrusted, to prevent injection such as SQL injection, XSS or insecure deserialization. It also notes memory corruption flaws are hard to find in penetration testing.

RESILIENCE. Defence against reverse engineering and tampering. See our article on mobile app resilience: these are extra layers, not a substitute for server-side security.

PRIVACY. OWASP says MASVS-PRIVACY is a baseline focused on what can be tested from the app itself, using public information or analysis of the app. It is not exhaustive and should not replace assessments required by law, such as a GDPR data protection impact assessment. It gives the example that data collected but not mentioned in the app store listing or privacy policy takes careful manual checking to spot. Data collection and data sharing are treated together, and what happens to data on remote servers is out of MASVS scope. We did not capture this area's individual control statements.

How to use it

  1. Hold a review. Ask each question and write the answer, even "we do not know".
  2. Mark each answer confirmed, unknown or gap.
  3. Fix gaps by risk, credentials and payment data first.
  4. Repeat before each major release.

Limits

This is a conversation tool, not a security audit or compliance certificate. We read the group pages' overviews and control statements (privacy statements not captured); we did not read individual control pages or the MASTG, and the standard has its own profiles and levels that we do not cover. Apps handling payments, health or children's data may have legal duties beyond this list.

By Omnistu.

Sources

Previous
Multi-factor authentication options compared: what each one protects against